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Abstract
Between the beginning of 1996 and the end of 1999 the Spanish Supreme Court settled 47 cases of claims
for damages from eye injuries, a type of damage that enables a precise intersubjective analysis of how the
social costs of personal injury are assessed from a legal and case law perspective. The legal regulation of
eye injuries and the applied case law are first analyzed and compensations awarded by the Supreme Court
are then compared with those which would be applied by the schedules of the ‘Ley de Responsabilidad
Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de Motor’ (law on civil liability and motor vehicle
insurance). Finally, the different types of cases are identified, normative changes which could reduce the
frequency and seriousness of this type of injury are proposed, the distinction between negligence and
strict liability is discussed and the fact that prosecution of highly similar damages is spread among
different jurisdictions is criticized.
The next issue of InDret will include With an eye to compensation (II).
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
3
· Where does the law stand?
In Spanish Law the legal texts relevant to eye injuries are: the Criminal and Civil Codes,
(PC)1 and (CC)2 respectively, Law 30/1992 (‘LRJAP’ - law on public administration)3 and
finally, the ‘Ley de Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de
Motor’ (‘Ley de baremos’ – schedules law)4.
1. Eye injuries caused maliciously
An eye injury caused maliciously is normally a crime or misdemeanor leading to injury
which is regulated under arts. 147 and ff. and 617 PC, the code which is applied in 15 cases.
Protection of individuals is primarily a criminal issue, at least in cases of malicious conduct,
and, in terms of the law’s deterrent effect, compensation for damages has a secondary role
compared with imprisonment or other types of sentence.
InDret would like to point out for its non-Spanish readers that a peculiarity of Spanish Criminal Law
is that civil liability resulting from a crime or misdemeanor is regulated by the Criminal Code (arts.
109 and ff. PC) and is settled by criminal proceedings, in accordance with arts. 100, 107 and ff. of the
‘Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal’ (LECr) (code of criminal procedure)5.
2. Eye injuries caused through negligence
An eye injury caused through negligence may be an offence or misdemeanor leading to
injury, or a tort, covered by arts. 1902 and ff. CC (17 cases), or give rise to liability of the
Public Administration according to arts. 139 and ff. ‘LRJAP’ (11 cases).
More specifically, the responsibility of the Public Administration resulting from eye
injuries and other types of harm has traditionally been regarded as simply strict liability
(Gefährdungshaftung), but the most significant cases are more difficult to describe: the
Supreme Court (SC), in order to restrict the imputation of damages to the facts, uses
different criteria of proximate causation (Causalidad y Responsabilidad) (causality and
liability) which bring strict liability and negligence closer together.
                                                 
1 Constitutional Law 10/1995, 23rd November, of the Criminal Code (B.O.E. nº 281, of 24th November).
2 Royal Decree of 24th July 1889, that orders publication in the “Gaceta de Madrid” of the revised edition of
the Civil Code (Gaceta de Madrid of 25th July 1889; Legislative Collection of Spain, volume CXLIII, second
semester of 1889, pag. 138).
3 Law 30/1992, of 26th November, of the ‘Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del
Procedimiento Administrativo Común’ (public administration legal system and common administrative
procedure (B.O.E. nº 285, of 27th November).
4 The 8th D. A. of Law 30/1995 (B.O.E. nº 268, of 9th November), changed the name of the ‘Ley de Uso y
Circulación de Vehículos de Motor’, Revised Text approved by Decree 632/1968, of 21st March, to the “Ley
de Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de Motor”, and rewrote Title I.
5 ‘Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal’, enacted by Royal Decree of 14th September 1882.
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3. The legal scheduling of eye injuries
In terms of the legal assessment of bodily injury, the ‘Ley de Responsabilidad Civil y
Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de Motor’ established baremos (schedules) for the
compensation of bodily injuries resulting from traffic accidents (art. 1.2 and section 1º.1 of
the Appendix). This law provides a comparative criterion for identical injuries caused to
different individuals. With this in mind, let us consider the following four hypothetical
cases:
- New-born child.
- 25 year old lawyer with a net annual income of 2,500,000 pts. (15,025.3 €).
- 50 year old architect with a net annual income of 10,000,000 pts. (60,101.21 €).
- 75 year old retired person with cataracts in both eyes and a net annual income
of 780,000 pts. (4,687.89 €).
Table 1 shows the compensation that would result from legal schedules being applied to
each of the four cases were that individual to suffer the type of eye injury specified in the
table:
Table 1
New-born
child
Lawyer, 25,
2.5m pts. annual
income
Architect, 50,
10m pts. annual
income
Retired person,
75, 780,000 pts.
annual income
Loss of one eye 8,813,789 7,407,592 9,203,602 6,704,994
Loss of both eyes 60,467,350 49,267,828 65,934,540 21,421,703
Loss of second eye 23,941,011 12,326,834 22,472,264 6,704,994
This model becomes more complicated if we distinguish between loss of sight and loss of
the eye itself (Table 2).
The breakdown of the sums which would result from applying the law of schedules to each
of the four cases, for both loss of sight and loss of an eye, is shown in Table 3.
· Where do the courts stand?
1. Comparative analysis of compensation awarded by the SC and that which
would result from applying the schedules law
In 35 of the 47 cases settled by the SC, claimants received all or part of the compensation
claimed. We know the amount awarded or agreed by the SC in 32 of these. In eight cases,
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the claimant received no compensation at all6. While it is not possible to establish a clear
trend on the basis of such a small sample, the following can perhaps be surmised:
a) In cases where an eye is lost the SC usually awards higher compensation than
would result from applying the schedules law.
In eight of the cases where loss of an eye was imputable to the defendant or accused, and where
we know the amount of compensation awarded, the average is 12,719,372 pts. (76,444.97 €),
almost 40% more than would result from applying the schedules law.
b) However, when the claimant has lost the sight of both eyes the SC tends to consider
fair compensation to be less than would result from applying the schedules law.
In four of the cases where the injury concerned loss of sight in both eyes, and was to be
compensated by the defendant or accused, the average is 31,493,018 pts. (189,276.85 €). Unlike
what happens in section a), the average compensation for new-born children and young or
middle-aged people is almost 50% less than would result from applying the schedules law7.
c) There are no significant differences in the average sums awarded or agreed by the
different chambers of the SC for the same types of cases and the discrepancies
which are at times observed are usually due to differences in the facts of the case
and, in particular, the age of the different victims.
Thus, for example, in a case of loss of one eye and loss of sight in the other (STS, 2nd, 14.4.1998:
young female victim of a malicious assault), the compensation was 26,961,611 pts. (162,042.54 €),
and in another, where there was loss of sight in both eyes (STS, 3rd, 26.3.1999: flying instructor
involved in an accident in 1960 loses his sight 30 years later), it was 10,290,000 pts. (61,844.15 €).
These conclusions are set out in Tables 3 and 4 .
d) The limitations of abrogation prevent SC case law from being used to assess the
frequency and seriousness of accidents causing eye injuries.
In particular, the rules of civil and contentious-administrative abrogation, which prevent
accession of those issues whose sum does not exceed 6,000,000 pts. (36,060.73 €)8 and 25,000,000
pts. (150,253.02 €)9 respectively, make it practically impossible for rulings on mild or less serious
eye injuries to be overturned.
                                                 
6 Finally, in three cases, the SC reduced the sum awarded and in two the amount of compensation went
unchallenged.
7 However, in the case of the retired person, the average compensation is almost 33% higher.
8 Art. 1687.1 c) of the Royal Decree of 3rd February 1881, that enacting the ‘Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil’
(Gaceta de Madrid, from 5th to 22nd February 1881).
9 Art. 86.2. b) of Law 29/1998, of 13th July, governing contentious-administrative jurisdiction. For cases
within the reference period it is art. 93.2. b) of the Law of 27th December 1956, governing contentious-
administrative jurisdiction (B.O.E. nº 363, of 28th December), annulled by the first, that sets a limit of
6,000,000 pts. (36,060.73 E.).
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The criteria of access to criminal abrogation established by the LECr are based principally on the
crime’s seriousness: only rulings by the ‘Audiencias’ (provincial courts) on injurious crimes
causing the loss or uselessness of an eye, those for which the PC recommends prison sentences of
more than 5 years, can be reviewed by the SC10.
However, the criterion of access to labor abrogation, which limits the cognisance of the SC - in
cases of eye injuries reviewed by petition of the Supreme Courts of Justice - to those appeals
which would unify legal doctrine, is not relevant11.
The above illustrates the limitations of any evaluation or proposal that may be made on the
basis of the 47 cases studied. One only has to compare the cases with statistics published by
the ‘Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales’12 (Department of Labor) on accidents
occurring during a working day and which affected the eyes: in 1998 there were 51,234
workplace accidents causing eye injuries of various kinds (6.8% of the total number of
accidents), of which 395 were serious.
2. The different types of case
The 47 SC rulings on eye injuries can be relatively easily grouped according to eight types
of case, albeit of different degrees: injuries suffered by children and adolescents (10 cases);
fights and assaults (12 cases); medical negligence (7 cases); police conduct (6 cases);
popular festivities –firework accidents- (3 cases); games and sport (2 cases); workplace
injuries (5 cases) and defective products (1 case).
In the pages that follow we will briefly describe these types and analyze the dogmatic,
analytic and legal policy problems which each one of them poses.
2.1 Doubly innocent victims: children and the disabled
a. The cases
Accidents caused and suffered by children and adolescents whilst playing or, what often
amounts to the same thing, whilst fighting – just as children do – is one of the groups with
the highest number of cases.
                                                 
10 The SC reviews under appeal those sentences passed by the ‘Audiencias’ in oral proceedings and
without right of appeal (art. 847 LECr.). These only hear cases without right of appeal for crimes where the
law recommends a custodial sentence of more than 5 years (art. 14.3º and 4º LECr.). For cases within the
reference period, changes in the criteria for access to criminal abrogation introduced by the Criminal Code
of 1995 and the successive modifications to the ‘Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal’ do not, in general, alter
the above conclusions, although the 1st D.F. PC of 1995 allowed milder eye injuries to be reviewed under
appeal.
11 Art. 216 and ff. of the Legislative Royal Decree 2/1995, of 7th April, which passed the Revised Text of the
‘Ley de Procedimiento Laboral’ (code of labour law procedure) (B.O.E. of 11th April).
12 ‘Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales’ (Department of Labor). Statistics on workplace injuries during
1998, in: http://www.mtas.es/Estadisticas/EAT/ACT/Index.htm.
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Many of what could be considered dangerous games are also perfectly avoidable: it is
very easy to hurt oneself or others when playing with sticks and stones, but it is also easy,
at least in a school, to stop children from playing with such things (STS, 1st , 18.10.1999,
games with sticks; STS, 1st , 16.2.1999, rubber balls whose diameter was less than that of an
eye socket). Similarly, on other occasions children handle objects that should never have
been within their reach (a broach with pin, STS, 1st , 10.12.1996; or a catapult, STS, 1st ,
17.9.1998; even more clearly: a hand grenade, STS, 1st , 17.4.1997). However, if it is
practically impossible to prevent use of the object with which the child caused the injury
(for example, a pencil, STS, 1st , 10.3.1997), the SC can take this circumstance into account
and reject the claim. The same applies if the game is intrinsically dangerous, but socially
acceptable and the child injuries him- or herself (fireworks, STS, 1st , 11.12.1996: the child
was injured whilst handling a firework). Of course, it is not only the degree of danger in a
game which is relevant, but also whether those playing it can be supervised: we have
already seen that schools are responsible for what occurs on their premises and can be
easily avoided (Niños y adolescentes) (children and adolescents). But schools are also
responsible when the injury results from inadequate maintenance of the premises, for
example, a hole in the metal fence surrounding a school (STS, 3rd , 12.2.1996), as would be
the owner of a highly dangerous place - for example, a shooting range - who didn’t fence
his property off (STS, 3rd , 17.4.1997)13.
Finally, there are extreme cases. For example, that of a 22 year old autistic young man,
already blind in one eye, who lost a second eye whilst moving furniture in the
occupational workshop he attended; the school’s director and the parents’ association
which managed it being held jointly liable for the accident (STS, 1st , 3.7.1998). It should be
highlighted that an important peculiarity of this case was that the court ordered the
defendants to pay a monthly life pension (100,000 pts.) instead of a lump sum. This is not
the first time that the SC has given a ruling of this nature; on other occasions they have also
ordered a pension to be paid instead of a lump sum (STS, 1st , 26.2.1998; STS, 1st , 17.3.1998;
STS, 1st , 29.7.1998).
This case law limiting the legal representatives’ powers clearly shows that the judges had little
confidence in the supervision offered by parents and tutors, but it is difficult to justify: it cannot
be justified by the law itself as this does not limit the powers of those responsible for care (art. 164
CC) or that of tutors (art. 271 CC) in the way the SC recommends. Although existing legislation
on the supervisory powers and disposition of parents and tutors may be debatable, and perhaps
there are those who believe it should be changed in order to reduce the supervisory abilities of
the above-mentioned legal representatives, it is even more questionable that judges can leave
aside legal standards and, what’s more, do so without justifying their decision (STS, 1st , 6.5.1998:
the SC awarded compensation of 60,000,000 pts. and imposed the previous judicial authorization
on the injured child’s parents in order to have access to sums greater than 3,000,000 pts.; STS, 1st ,
15.10.1996: the SC awarded compensation of 80,776,000 pts., ordered a part of this sum –
60,776,000 pts.- to be deposited in a bank account in the child’s name and enforced the previous
judicial authorization so that the parents of the injured child could have access to the capital). If,
for example, the SC had had, in this or other cases, reason to believe that the parents’
                                                 
13 Abuse of children (STS, 2nd , 28.6.1999) can be considered under the second type of case, fights and
assaults.
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administration would place their child’s assets at risk (art. 167 CC), then it should have made this
clear and justified its position. From a practical point of view, the converting of trust into control
carries obvious additional costs, a central feature of the theory of agency costs which InDret has
pointed out on more than one occasion (Agency Models in Law and Economics). Perhaps the
most reasonable solution would be to compound the pension and invest the capital in a fund.
b. Negligence and strict liability: a war of words
The child, who is often both causer and victim of the injury14, is a doubly innocent victim
and there is a common theme running through the above-mentioned cases: in almost all of
them there is a failure to take adequate safety measures on the part of the person or
organization in whose realm of influence the accident occurred. It is understood that
schools must prevent children who are carrying dangerous objects from entering the
premises and that they should stop dangerous games before they begin, but it should also
be noted that the SC does not usually pass sentence simply because an accident was caused
unless it could reasonably be attributed to a failure to take adequate safety measures. Due
to a nuance that we will deal with below, simple misfortune does not lead to compensation.
The doctrine of the general risks of life is also applicable, albeit to a limited extent, to
children.
It remains to be seen whether this First Chamber criterion would also be applied by the
Third Chamber. According to the dominant reading of existing legislation, those public
bodies who are in charge of centers or premises in which a child is injured in an accident
are strictly liable i.e. for the simple causing of an injury aside from any considerations
regarding failure to take adequate safety measures or, to put it another way, the abnormal
functioning of public services. But the cases of eye injuries decided by the Third Chamber
do not fit this picture, nor do they clearly distinguish between negligence and strict liability
(for example, STS, 3rd , 12.2.1996; STS, 3rd , 16.2.1999). In fact, the way in which decisions are
reached does not really differ between the Third and First Chambers and indeed, it would
not make much sense to apply different standards of liability to the same type of accident
simply because one took place in a public school and another in a private one. The
phenomena that can be observed, however, are as follows:
i. As by law the Third Chamber cannot deal with negligence, and given that
neither would it be reasonable to associate responsibility with simple causal
connections, the debate over negligence leads, in practice, to questions of
causality, that is to say, to proximate causation (Objektive Zurechnung), and
provided that the Third Chamber considers that the accident is not
imputable to a material causer what it does is exclude the issue of causality
(STS, 3rd , 10.2.1998). Once again we see that an important part of the
argument about negligence and causality is interchangeable, fungible.
                                                 
14 Of the ten cases decided by the SC in which the victim was a child or disabled person, the victim and
causer was the same person in four of these.
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
9
The SC, in the above-mentioned STS, 3rd , 10.2.1998, denied there was a causal
relationship between the oxygen supplied to a premature baby’s incubator and
the blindness which the child suffered as a result of the subsequently diagnosed
disease retrolental fibroplasia: “It is clear that the etiology of this disease is
multifactorial (...) its precise cause being unknown and, furthermore, the supply
of oxygen is utterly necessary when seeking the viability of premature babies
(FD. 5)”. “Therefore, a causal relationship was essential for declaring the
liability of the Public Administration (...) and, in the case in question, this
remains to be demonstrated (FD. 8)».
ii. Another technique used by the Third Chamber to furtively introduce issues
of negligence into the legal realm of strict liability is to simply deny
unlawfulness, the said chamber considering this to be a requisite in
accordance with art. 141.1 LRJAP (STS, 3rd , 18.10.1999). Once again, this is a
verbal artifice: traditionally, negligence has been defined as a breach of the
duty of care towards others, a duty which is graded in each area according
to social norms and criteria that the judge then translates into legal terms.
When the Third Chamber declares that the action of the accused
administration is not unlawful this means that there has been no failure of
duty with regard to precautions:
The SC (STS, 3rd , 21.12.1998) denied unlawfulness in the case of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff who, during an unauthorized demonstration, suffered
a detached retina when he was hit by the water jets being used by the police to
break up the demonstration: “In a democracy, the police are constitutionally
and legally empowered to maintain public order (...); in no way can it be said
(...) that the police exceeded their powers. It could even be said that among the
control measures which the police are authorized to use in such cases – once
those requisites demanded by the law have been fulfilled (...) – the one used in
this case posed the least danger to those on the receiving end of the police
action” (FD. 3).
iii. Thirdly, a further nuance, which may be implacable, should be specified,
one which perhaps results from the care function that characterizes the
Welfare State. In terms of a specific criterion for accusing the Public
Administration, the body responsible for the service in which the accident
took place, the damage caused could be considered as the seriousness of the
accident plus its high degree of improbability. A very serious and
unexpected accident would lead, above and beyond any notion of
negligence, to compensation more in line with strict liability, and thus come
under Spanish administrative law and the Third Chamber. From this
perspective, the Administration would provide insurance against injuries
suffered in unforeseen, serious and improbable accidents (but, however, not
against non-serious and easily foreseeable accidents, such as mild sporting
injuries).
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c. The unwritten privilege of domestic relations
It must also be pointed out that in the majority of cases that give rise to liability it is not
only the breach of precautionary duties which is relevant , but also the fact that the child
was subject to an educational or similar regime and under no circumstances did the
accident occur in the context of family or domestic life. There is thus an unwritten privilege
ascribed to family relationships in that parents and siblings - at least - or close relatives -
whether younger or older - are not responsible for eye injuries, however serious they may
be, which are caused through negligence, and even less so if these were unforeseen. There
are two reasons for justifying this privilege which is inscribed in Common Law (Domestic
Relations):
i. Pain and suffering of the injurer himself is in itself a punishment that
provides incentives for deterrence.
ii. Increasing the costs of being a parent or sibling by adding the duty to
assume the costs of damages caused to a close relative is considered to be
counterproductive.
Whatever the case, the previous doctrine is on its way out and parents and children are
now always held responsible for malicious damage and increasingly are so in cases of
severe negligence: the figures for child abuse rise exponentially from the point at which its
definition included an increasing number of physical and psychological abuses, not only
sexual in nature, and, in addition, ended up including all the imaginable forms of neglect
(HACKING, Ian. The Social Construction of What?, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press, 1999).
2.2 Fights and assaults
With a single exception, the twelve cases of fights and assaults ending in a serious eye
injury were settled by the Second Chamber of the SC. In all of them the damage was
malicious and, almost as a consequence of this, absurd: sailor, angry at the punishment
imposed on him by his captain (one hour of guard duty!), hits him and makes him lose an
eye (STS, 2nd, 23.4.1996); soldier fights with his corporal who receives a punch resulting in
a hematoma (STS, 5th, 19.7.1999); two flatmates argue, one knocks the other to the floor and
stabs him repeatedly in the face with a gas poker, removing one of his eyes and leaving
him blind in the other (STS, 2nd, 14.4.1998); woman who has fallen out with her neighbor
unexpectedly hits her with a blunt instrument causing her serious injuries in one eye (STS,
2nd, 8.4.1999); couple argue due to the woman’s jealousy and her partner hits her in the face
with an electric fan causing almost total loss of sight (STS, 2nd, 30.11.1999); woman,
separated from her husband, runs him over with her car in an attempt to kill him and
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causes him serious physical and psychological injuries including partial loss of sight in
one eye (STS, 2nd, 11.2.1999); a nightclub bouncer pushes a customer out onto the street,
fights with him and two other men, kills one of them and causes several injuries to the
others, in particular, a hemorrhage in the right eye of one of the victims (STS, 2nd, 8.7.1998);
bouncer of a singles bar who gets involved in an argument between a barman and a
drunk customer whom he then throws out and beats up in the street causing him very
serious injuries (aphasia, cognitive and locomotor difficulties), among whose sequelae are a
right hemiparesis (paralysis) of one eye (STS, 2nd, 11.11.1998); customer in a bar, drunk,
argues with another and hits him with a glass causing several serious injuries in one eye
(STS, 2nd, 25.11.1998); couple in a bar attack a young woman: the man punches the victim
in the eye causing a contusion while his partner bites one of her ears off (STS, 2nd,
21.4.1999); bar owner, with a criminal record, forces a customer who is a jeweler to hand
over the keys to his shop and when the victim tries to shout for help he is knocked to the
floor and hit, suffering injuries in one eye (STS, 2nd, 8.10.1999); young man, bothered by a
conversation (“Young people today are all poofs because they don’t smoke marihuana”), turns
around and attacks the two people who were talking, causing a bruised eye in one whilst
the other, who had AIDS, died as a result of the injuries suffered from being hit in the
mouth and stomach (STS, 2ª, 29.5.1999); young girl, assaulted by her parents, suffers,
among multiple injuries (edema and hyperemia of the left side of the skull, left parietal
fracture), a serious palpebral hematoma in one eye (STS, 2nd, 28.6.1999).
We have already said that in the cases reviewed there is an inherently absurd aspect to the
malicious or gratuitous fights described, and in most of them this is more than likely
brought on by alcohol. It should be noted that in only one of them does the aggressor
appear to act with personal profit in mind (robbing a jeweler: STS, 2nd, 8.10.1999). The norm
is the gratuitousness of the malicious violence, not its instrumental rationality.
Secondly, in all the above-mentioned cases, although the amount of compensation awarded
for damages appears to be similar to that awarded for equivalent damages by the First or
Third Chambers of the SC, its deterrent effect is greatly reduced when one compares it to
the penalty, in the strict sense of the word, imposed by the Second Chamber.
Actually, it is difficult to make comparisons because in cases of multiple injuries Second Chamber
case law does not quantify the amount of compensation that corresponds to each type of injury,
not exactly good practice from the point of view of tort law (STS, 2nd, 11.11.1998; STS, 2nd,
11.2.1999; STS, 2nd, 8.4.1999; STS, 2nd, 28.6.1999; STS, 2nd, 8.10.1999).
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TABLES
Table 2
New-born
Child
Lawyer, 25, 2.5m
pts. annual
income
Architect, 50, 10m
pts. annual
income
Retired person,
75, 780,000 pts.
annual income
Loss of sight in
one eye
7,084,587 5,480,058 7,250,163 4,749,832
Loss of sight in
both eyes
59,809,438 48,549,522 65,482,855 21,353,176
Loss of sight in the
second eye
21,871,234 10,176,719 20,233,471 4,848,675
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Table 3
Table 3 shows the breakdown of the amounts of compensation which result from applying
the schedules law to the four cases for each of the different eye injuries: loss of one eye, of
both eyes or the second eye; and loss of sight in one eye, in both eyes or the second eye.
It should be remembered that the schedules law works with very wide compensation
margins so there is inevitably a degree of subjectivity when applying it to the cases studied.
1. LOSS OF AN EYE
New-born child
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Cosmetic injury
5,816,190
2,196,662
317,337
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
82,320
401,280
TOTAL 8,813,789
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Lawyer, 25, 2.5m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Cosmetic injury
5,345,370
534,537
500,000
495,525
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
48,360
TOTAL 7,407,592
Architect, 50, 10m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Cosmetic injury
4,874,580
2,437,290
1,000,000
83,166
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
241,800
TOTAL 9,203,602
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Retired person, 75, 780,000 pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
3,223,560
322,356
3,000,000
68,526
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
8,232
TOTAL 6,704,994
2. LOSS OF BOTH EYES
New-born child
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
31,359,220
10,983,309
10,983,309
6,000,000
657,912
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
82,320
401,280
TOTAL 60,467,350
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Lawyer, 25, 2.5m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
28,943,265
2,894,327
10,983,309
2,196,662
3,000,000
718,305
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
48,360
TOTAL 49,267,828
Architect, 50, 10m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
26,527,225
13,263,612
10,983,309
10,983,309
3,000,000
451,685
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
241,800
TOTAL 65,934,540
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
17
Retired person, 75, 780,000 pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
15,693,295
1,569,330
1,000,000
3,000,000
68,526
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
8,232
TOTAL 21,421,703
3. LOSS OF SECOND EYE
New-born child
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
82,320
401,280
TOTAL 23,941,011
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Lawyer, 25, 2.5m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
5,345,370
534,537
2,196,662
3,000,000
718,305
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
48,360
TOTAL 12,326,834
Architect, 50, 10m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
4,874,580
2,437,290
10,983,309
3,000,000
451,685
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
241,800
TOTAL 22,472,264
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Retired person, 75, 780,000 pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Serious disability
§ Cosmetic injury
3,223,560
322,356
3,000,000
68,526
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
8,232
TOTAL 6,704,994
4. LOSS OF SIGHT IN ONE EYE
New-born child
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Partial permanent disability
4,404,325
2,196,662
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
82,320
401,280
TOTAL 7,084,587
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Lawyer, 25, 2.5m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Partial permanent disability
4,043,725
404,373
500,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
48,360
TOTAL 5,480,058
Architect, 50, 10m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Partial permanent disability
3,683,175
1,841,588
1,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
241,800
TOTAL 7,250,163
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Retired person, 75, 780,000 pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Serious disability
1,508,536
150,844
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
8,232
TOTAL 4,749,832
5. LOSS OF SIGHT IN BOTH EYES
New-born child
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
31,359,220
10,983,309
10,983,309
6,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
82,320
401,280
TOTAL 59,809,438
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Lawyer, 25, 2.5m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Serious disability
28,943,265
2,894,326
10,983,309
2,196,662
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
48,360
TOTAL 48,549,522
Architect, 50, 10m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
26,527,225
13,263,612
10,983,309
10,983,309
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
241,800
TOTAL 65,482,855
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Retired person, 75, 780,000 pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Additional pain and suffering
§ Serious disability
15,693,295
1,569,329
1,000,000
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
8,232
TOTAL 21,353,176
6. LOSS OF SIGHT IN SECOND EYE
New-born child
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
4,404,325
10,983,309
6,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
82,320
401,280
TOTAL 21,871,234
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Lawyer, 25, 2.5m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Partial permanent disability
§ Serious disability
4,043,725
404,372
2,196,662
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
48,360
TOTAL 10,176,719
Architect, 50, 10m pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Permanent total disability
§ Serious disability
3,683,175
1,841,587
10,983,309
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
§ Without time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
401,280
241,800
TOTAL 20,233,471
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Retired person, 75, 780,000 pts. annual income
Categories Amounts (pts.)
Permanent injuries
Basic compensation
Correction factors
§ Pecuniary loss
§ Serious disability
1,508,436
249,687
3,000,000
Temporary disability
Basic compensation
§ With time in hospital
Correction factor: pecuniary loss
82,320
8,232
TOTAL 4,848,675
InDret 3/2000 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna
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Table 4
1st
Chamber
2nd Chamber 3rd Chamber Average total
Loss of an eye 10,882,707 13,179,971 14,095,439 12,719,372
Table 5
1st
Chamber
2nd Chamber 3rd Chamber Average total
Loss of sight in one eye 17,019,660 7,303,842 12,161,751
Loss of sight in both
eyes
62,604,360 21,584,695 10,290,000 31,493,018
